In De Anima III.5, Aristotle introduces the notion of the active intellect (nous poiētikos), one of the most obscure and contested concepts in his philosophy of mind. In this paper, I argue that the active intellect is comparable to consciousness understood as a higher-order form of awareness through which thought becomes available to itself.

I begin by examining Aristotle’s distinction between the passive and active intellects. The passive intellect is potentially capable of becoming all intelligible objects, whereas the active intellect makes potentially intelligible forms actually intelligible. I then analyze Aristotle’s analogy with light. Just as light makes potentially visible colors actually visible, the active intellect actualizes what is only potentially available to thought.

On this basis, I argue that the active intellect bears a structural resemblance to consciousness. Both account for the transition from the mere presence of a mental state to its availability as an object of awareness. I develop this comparison through three characteristics of the active intellect: reflexivity, discreteness, and immortality. Although Aristotle does not formulate a modern theory of consciousness, his account of the active intellect offers a philosophical framework for understanding how thought becomes present to the thinker.